# How Awala apps may circumvent Internet censorship

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By Gus Narea, architect of Awala and founder of Relaycorp.

# Awala enables <u>compatible</u> apps to communicate with <u>and without</u> the Internet.



#### Letro



#### Twitter (Awala's PoC)



#### **Potential apps**

















### **Example apps**








Letro on Android



### Awala with the Internet





### Awala without the Internet

### **Current status**

- Awala runs on Android and desktop.
- Letro only runs on Android.
- Undergoing a security audit.
- Top priority: Testing and gradual rollout.

# Potential censorship circumvention capabilities

# Denylist censorship circumvention

Specific services, such as Awala *gateways*, are blocked

- We'd turn <u>any</u> HTTPS website into a proxy.
- Censors couldn't do active probing.
- Censors could analyse the traffic, but we'd also make it follow an "organic" web browsing pattern.

# National intranet circumvention

Only domestic services are accessible

- Use couriers as if it were an Internet blackout.
- Leverage intranet services to relay <u>high-priority</u> data using steganography.

# Allowlist censorship circumvention


Only select services are allowed

- Use couriers as if it were an Internet blackout.
- Less likely that we'll be able to leverage sanctioned services to relay data.

# Threats to Awala's censorship circumvention

### Not achieving a critical mass of users

- Like any platform on day 1, <u>Awala needs a killer app</u>.
- Censorship circumvention alone is insufficient.
- It must be essential or extremely useful outside censorship episodes.
- We're trying to position Letro as that app.




## **Endpoint-level censorship**



Image source: KCNA/Reuters

### Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks

- Awala is decentralised with a federated architecture.
- Servers (called "gateways") act as brokers.
- Gateways, especially the default ones, may be subject to DDoS attacks.
- Our mitigation strategy is part of the security audit.
- Feedback on Despacito, a key component in the strategy, is most welcomed.



## That's all folks!

#### More information:

- awala.network
- letro.app/en
- despacito.bot
- gus@relaycorp.tech